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alleges56	-	as	Judith	Donath	explains,	"News	is	shared	not	just	to	inform	or	even	to	persuade.	It	
is	used	as	a	marker	of	identity,	a	way	to	proclaim	your	affinity	with	a	particular	community."57			
	
Donath's	insight	helps	explain	why	factchecking,	blocking	fake	news	or	urging	people	to	support	
diverse,	fact-based	news	is	unlikely	to	check	the	spread	of	highly	partisan	news.	Not	only	is	
partisan	news	comfortable	and	enjoyable	(I	find	it	reassuring	to	watch	Trevor	Noah	or	
Samantha	Bee	and	assume	that	friends	on	the	right	feel	the	same	watching	Fox	News	
commentators),	spreading	this	information	has	powerful	social	rewards	and	gives	a	sense	of	
shared	efficacy,	the	feeling	(real	or	imagined)	that	you	are	making	norms-based	social	change	
by	shaping	the	information	environment.	
	
The	research	Benkler,	I	and	our	team	conducted	shows	how	rapidly	these	partisan	ecosystems	
can	come	into	being.	Examining	1.25	million	media	stories	and	25,000	media	sources,	we	gave	
each	media	source	a	partisanship	score	based	on	whether	people	who	shared	tweets	from	the	
Democratic	or	Republican	candidates	also	shared	a	story	from	a	source.	Stories	from	the	New	
York	Times	were	more	often	shared	by	people	who’d	retweeted	Hillary	Clinton	than	those	
who’d	retweeted	Donald	Trump,	but	the	effect	was	much	more	pronounced	with	Breitbart:	
Breitbart	was	amplified	almost	exclusively	by	Trump	supporters.	Our	research	shows	a	tightly	
clustered	set	of	sites	read	only	by	the	nationalist	right.	The	vast	majority	of	these	sites	are	very	
new,	most	founded	during	the	Obama	administration.	This	community	of	interest	has	very	little	
overlap	with	traditional	conservative	sources	like	the	Wall	Street	Journal	or	the	National	
Review.	In	our	study,	those	publications	are	both	low	in	influence	and	linked	to	by	both	the	left	
and	right,	while	the	Breitbart-centered	cluster	functions	as	an	echo	chamber.	
	
The	emergence	of	echo	chambers	like	the	one	around	Breitbart	further	complicates	fact-
checking.	danah	boyd	explains	that	in	teaching	students	not	to	rely	on	Wikipedia,	we’ve	
encouraged	them	to	triangulate	their	way	to	truth	from	Google	search	results.58	On	topics	
covered	heavily	in	the	Breitbartosphere	but	not	addressed	in	the	broader	media	universe,	this	
leads	to	a	perverse	effect.	Search	for	information	on	Pizzagate	as	the	story	was	being	
developed	on	sites	like	Infowars	and	you	would	likely	find	links	to	other	far-right	sites	
promoting	the	story.	By	the	time	sites	like	the	New	York	Times	became	aware	of	the	story	and	
began	debunking	it,	many	interested	in	the	faux-scandal	had	persuaded	themselves	of	its	truth	
through	repetition	within	a	subset	of	closely	related	websites,	to	the	point	where	an	unstable	
individual	took	up	arms	to	“self-investigate”	the	controversy.59	
	
Hallin’s	spheres	suggests	we	question	whether	we	are	encouraged	to	discuss	a	wide	enough	
range	of	topics	within	the	sphere	of	legitimate	controversy.	The	problem	we	face	now	is	one	in	
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which	dialog	is	challenging,	if	not	impossible,	because	one	party’s	sphere	of	consensus	is	the	
other’s	sphere	of	deviance	and	vice	versa.	Our	debates	are	complicated	not	only	because	we	
cannot	agree	on	a	set	of	shared	facts,	but	because	we	cannot	agree	what’s	worth	talking	about	
in	the	first	place.	When	one	camp	sees	Hillary	Clinton’s	controversial	email	server	as	evidence	
of	her	lawbreaking	and	deviance	(sphere	of	consensus	for	many	on	the	right)	or	as	a	needless	
distraction	from	more	relevant	issues	(sphere	of	deviance	for	many	on	the	left),	we	cannot	
agree	to	disagree,	as	we	cannot	agree	that	the	conversation	is	worth	having	in	the	first	place.	
	
Much	as	there	is	no	obvious,	easy	solution	to	countering	mistrust	in	institutions,	I	have	no	
panaceas	for	polarization	and	echo	chambers.	Still,	it’s	worth	identifying	these	phenomena	–	
and	acknowledging	their	deep	roots	–	as	we	seek	solutions	to	these	pressing	problems.	It	is	
worth	noting	that	the	research	Benkler’s	and	my	team	carried	out	suggests	the	phenomenon	of	
asymmetric	polarization	–	in	our	analysis,	those	on	the	far	right	are	more	isolated	in	terms	of	
viewpoints	they	encounter	than	those	on	the	far	left.	There’s	nothing	in	our	research	that	
suggests	the	right	is	inherently	more	prone	to	ideological	isolation.	By	understanding	how	
extreme	polarization	has	developed	recently,	it	might	be	possible	to	stop	the	left	from	
developing	a	similar	echo	chamber.	Our	research	also	suggests	that	the	center	right	has	a	
productive	role	to	play	in	building	media	that	appeals	to	an	insurrectionist	and	alienated	right-
leading	audience,	which	keeps	those	important	viewpoints	in	dialog	with	existing	communities	
in	the	left,	center	and	right.	
	
Fundamentally,	I	believe	that	the	polarization	of	dialog	in	the	media	is	a	result	both	of	new	
media	technologies	and	of	the	deeper	changes	of	trust	in	institutions	and	in	how	civics	is	
practiced.	The	Breitbartosphere	is	possible	not	just	because	it’s	easier	than	ever	to	create	a	
media	outlet	and	share	viewpoints	with	the	like-minded.	It’s	possible	because	low	trust	in	
government	leads	people	to	seek	new	ways	of	being	engaged	and	effective,	and	low	trust	in	
media	leads	people	to	seek	out	different	sources.	Making	and	disseminating	media	feels	like	
one	of	the	most	effective	ways	to	engage	in	civics	in	a	low-trust	world,	and	the	2016	elections	
suggest	that	this	civic	media	is	a	powerful	force	we	are	only	now	starting	to	understand.	
	
	
Closing	questions	
	
I	want	to	acknowledge	that	this	paper	may	stray	far	from	the	immediate	challenges	that	face	us	
around	issues	of	information	quality,	in	the	service	of	seeking	for	their	deeper	roots.	My	
questions	follow	in	the	same	spirit.	For	the	most	part,	these	are	questions	to	which	I	don’t	have	
a	good	answer.	Some	are	active	research	questions	for	my	lab.	My	fear	is	that	we	may	have	to	
address	some	of	these	underlying	questions	before	tackling	tactical	questions	of	how	we	should	
best	respond	to	immediate	challenges	to	faith	in	journalism.	
	
	
	
Trust:	
- How	long	does	it	take	to	recover	trust	in	an	institution	that	has	failed?	What	are	
examples	of	a	mistrusted	institution	regaining	public	trust?	
- Is	the	fall	in	institutional	trust	an	independent	or	a	joint	phenomenon	–	i.e.,	does	losing	
trust	in	Congress	lessen	our	trust	in	the	Supreme	Court	or	the	medical	system	
- Is	trust	in	news	media	higher	or	lower	in	countries	with	strong	public/taxpayer	
supported	media?	Does	trust	correlate	positively	or	negatively	to	ad	support?	Privacy-
invading	tracking	and	targeting?	
- If	people	don’t	trust	institutions,	who	or	what	do	they	trust?	How	do	those	patterns	
differ	for	more	trusting	elites	and	for	the	broader	population?		
	
Participation:	
- What	forms	of	participation	(from	the	traditional,	like	voting,	to	the	non-traditional,	like	
making	CNN-bashing	memes)	are	indicators	of	future	civic	engagement?	Should	we	be	
encouraging	and	celebrating	a	broader	range	of	civic	participation	amongst	youth?	
Amongst	groups	that	see	themselves	alienated	from	conventional	politics?	
- Should	media	attempt	to	explain	and	engage	audiences	more	deeply	in	institutional	
politics?	Will	acknowledging	the	limits	of	existing	institutional	politics	restore	trust	in	
journalism,	or	damage	trust	in	government?	
- Should	media	celebrate	and	promote	new	forms	of	civic	engagement?	Will	this	further	
decrease	trust	in	institutions?	Increase	a	sense	of	citizen	efficacy?	
- What	would	media	designed	for	increased	public	participation	look	like?	Are	there	
models	in	the	advocacy	journalism	space,	or	in	solutions	journalism,	constructive	
journalism	or	other	movements?	
	
Polarization:	
- Is	it	reasonable	to	expect	Americans	to	rely	on	a	single,	or	small	set,	of	professional	
media	sources	that	report	a	relatively	value-neutral	set	of	stories?	Or	is	this	goal	of	
journalistic	non-partisanship	no	longer	a	realistic	ideal?	
- Could	taxpayer-sponsored	media	serve	a	function	of	anchoring	discourse	around	a	
single	set	of	facts?	Or	will	public	media	be	inherently	untrustworthy	to	some	portion	of	
American	voters?	Why	does	public	media	seem	to	work	well	in	other	low-trust	nations	
but	not	in	the	US?	
- Is	there	a	role	for	high-quality,	factual	but	partisan	media	that	might	reach	audiences	
alienated	from	mainstream	media?	
- Should	media	outlets	learn	from	what’s	consensus,	debatable	and	deviant	in	other	
media	spheres	and	modify	coverage	to	intersect	with	reader’s	spheres?	Is	shifting	the	
boundaries	of	these	spheres	part	of	how	civics	is	conducted	today?	
	
	
	
	
	
	
